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Abstract—This paper presents a methodology and a system,
named LogMaster, for mining correlations of events that have
multiple attributions, i.e., node ID, application ID, event type,
and event severity, in logs of large-scale cluster systems. Different
from traditional transactional data, e.g., supermarket purchases,
system logs have their unique characteristic, and hence we
propose several innovative approaches to mine their correlations.
We present a simple metrics to measure correlations of events
that may happen interleavedly. On the basis of the measurement
of correlations, we propose two approaches to mine event
correlations; meanwhile, we propose an innovative abstraction—
event correlation graphs (ECGs) to represent event correlations,
and present an ECGs-based algorithm for predicting events. For
two system logs of a production Hadoop-based cloud computing
system at Research Institution of China Mobile and a production
HPC cluster system at Los Alamos National Lab (LANL), we
evaluate our approaches in three scenarios: (a) predicting all
events on the basis of both failure and non-failure events; (b)
predicting only failure events on the basis of both failure and
non-failure events; (c) predicting failure events after removing
non-failure events.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cluster systems are common platforms for both high per-
formance computing and cloud computing. As the scales of
cluster systems increase, failures become normal [6]. It has
been long recognized that (failure) events are correlated, not
independent. In an early year as 1992, Tang et al. [30] con-
cluded that the impact of correlated failures on dependability
is significant. Though we can not infer causalities among dif-
ferent events without invasive approaches like request tracing
[15], we indeed can find out correlations among different
events through a data mining approach. This paper focuses on
mining recurring event sequences with timing orders that have
correlations, which we call event rules. As an intuition, if there
is an event rule that identifies the correlation of warning events
and a fatal event, the occurrence of warning events indicates
that a failure may happen in a near future, so mining event
rules is the basis for predicting failures.
Considerable work has been done in mining frequent itemset
in transactional data, e.g., supermarket purchases, [52] [53].
However, system logs are different from transactional data
in four aspects. First, for event data, the timing order plays
an important role. Moreover, a predicted event sequence
without the timing constraints provides little information for
a failure prediction, so we have to consider time among event
occurrences rather than just their occurrence [10]. Second, logs
are temporal. Only on condition that events fall within a time
window, we can consider those events may have correlations.
Third, a failure event has many important attributions, i.e.,
node ID, application ID, event type, and event severity. For
a failure prediction, those attributions are ingredient. For
example, if you predict a failure without node information,
an administrator can not take an appropriate action. Last,
different events may happen interleavedly, and hence it is
difficult to define a metrics for event correlation. For example,
it is difficult to define the event correlation between two events
A and B in an event sequence BACBBA, since A and B
happen interleavedly.
On the basis of Apriori-like algorithms [52] [53], several
previous efforts propose new approaches for frequent itemset,
event bursts, periodical events, mutual-dependent events [10],
frequent episodes [57], sequential patterns[62] or closed se-
quential patterns [58] [59], however mining multi-attribution
event rules in system logs of large-scale cluster systems has
its unique requirements as mentioned above. For example,
in [59], instead of mining the complete set of frequent
subsequences, Yan et al. mine frequent closed subsequences
only, i.e., those containing no super-sequence with the same
occurrence frequency, which is difficult to directly apply in
mining event rules for the purpose of predicting failures. Some
work proposed Apriori-like algorithms in predicting failures
[5] without providing details (multi-attribution) or rare events
[2] [63], which are limited to the specified target events.
Our effort in this paper focuses on mining event rules in
system logs. Taking into account the unique characteristic of
logs, we propose a simple metrics to measure event correla-
tions in a sliding time windows. Different from Apriori that
generates item set candidates of a length k from all item sets
of a length k−1 [52] [53], we proposed a simplified algorithm
that generates a n − ary event rule candidate if and only if
its two (n− 1)−ary adjacent subsets are frequent, and hence
we significantly decrease the time complexity. We validate our
approaches on the logs of a 260-node Hadoop cluster system
at Research Institution of China Mobile and a production HPC
cluster system—Machine 20 of 256 nodes at Los Alamos
National Lab, which we call the Hadoop logs and the HPC
logs, respectively. For predicting events in the Hadoop logs
and the HPC logs, the precision rates are high as 78.20%,
81.19%, respectively. We also evaluate our approaches in three
scenarios: (a) predicting all events on the basis of both failure
and non-failure events; (b) predicting only failure events on
the basis of both failure and non-failure events; (c) predicting
2failure events after removing non-failure events.
Our contributions are four-fold. First, we propose a simple
metrics to measure event correlations. Second, on the basis
of the measurement metrics, we propose two approaches
(Apriori-LES and Apriori-semiLES) to mining event correla-
tions. Third, we design an innovative abstraction–events cor-
relation graphs (ECGs), to represent event rules, and present
an ECGs-based algorithm for event prediction. Fourth, for the
first time, we compare the breakdown of events of different
types and events rules in two typical cluster systems for cloud
and HPC, respectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II ex-
plains basic concepts. Section III presents LogMaster design.
Section IV gives out LogMaster implementation. Experiment
results and evaluations on the Hadoop logs and the HPC logs
are summarized in Section V. In Section VI, we describe the
related work. We draw a conclusion and discuss the future
work in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND, AND BASIC CONCEPTS
A. Background of two real system logs
The 260-node Hadoop cluster system is used to run
MapReduce-like cloud applications, including 10 management
nodes, which are used to analyze logs or manage system, and
250 data nodes, which are used to run Hadoop applications.
We collect the Hadoop logs by using /dev/error, /var/log,
IBM Tivoli, HP openview, and NetLogger, then store them
on the management nodes. So these logs include system
service and kernel logs, such as crond, mountd, rpc.statd,
sshd, syslogd, xinetd, and so on. The HPC logs are available
from (http://institutes.lanl.gov/data/fdata/). TABLE I give the
summary of system logs from the Hadoop and HPC cluster
systems.
Log name Days Start
Date
End
Date
Log
Size
No. of
Records
Hadoop 67 2008-
10-26
2008-
12-31
130
MB
977858
HPC 1005 2003-
07-31
2006-
04-40
31.5
MB
433490
TABLE I: The summary of logs
We use nine-tuples (timestamp, log ID, node ID, event
ID, severity degree, event type, application name, process
ID, user ID) to describe each event. For an upcoming
event, if a new 2-tuple (severity degree, event type) is
reported, our system will generate and assign a new eventID
associated with this event. Similarly, if a new 4-tuple
(node ID, event ID, application name, process ID) is re-
ported, we will create and assign a new logID associated with
this event, and hence a log ID will contain rich information,
including severity degree, event type, node ID, application
name, and process ID.
B. Basic concepts
Definition 1: An n-ary log ID sequence (LES): an n− ary
LES is a sequences of n events that have different log IDs
element item description
timestamp The occurrence time associated with the event
severity degree Include five levels: INFO, WARNING, ERROR,
FAILURE, FATAL
event type Include HARDWARE, SYSTEM, APPLICA-
TION, FILESYSTEM, and NETWORK
event ID An event ID is a mapping function of a 2-tuple
(severity degree, event type).
node ID The location of the event
application name The name of the application that associates with
the event
process ID The ID of the process that associated with the
event
log ID A log ID is a mapping function of a 4-tuple (node
ID, event ID, application name, process ID).
user The user that associated the event
TABLE II: The descriptions about the elements of nine-tuples
in a chronological order. An n − ary LES is composed of
an (n − 1) − ary LES (n ∈ N+, n > 1) and an event of
log ID X (X 6∈ (n − 1) − ary ES ) with the presumed
timing constraint that an event of log ID X follows after the
(n − 1) − ary LES. We call the (n − 1) − ary LES is the
preceding events and the event of log ID X is the posterior
event.
For example, for a 3− ary LES (A,B,C), (A,B) are the
preceding events, while C is the posterior event. In this paper,
we simply use an event X instead of an event of log ID X .
Definition 2: A subset of LES : If the event elements of
an m − ary LES are a subset of the event elements of an
n − ary LES (m < n), meanwhile the timing constraints of
the m− ary LES do not violate the timing constraints of the
n − ary ES, we call the m − ary LES is the subset of the
n− ary LES.
For example, for a 3 − ary LES (A,B,C), its 2 − ary
subsets include (A,B), (A,C) and (B,C). However, (B,A)
is not its 2−ary subset, since it violated the timing constraints
of (A,B,C).
Definition 3: (n−1)−ary adjacent subset of n−ary LES:
For an (n−1)−ary LES that is the subset of an n−ary LES,
if all adjacent events of (n−1)−ary LES are also adjacent in
the n− ary LES, we call the (n− 1)− ary LES the adjacent
subset of the n− ary LES.
For an n−ary LES (a1, a2, . . . , a(n−1), a(n)), it has two
(n − 1) − ary adjacent subsets: (a1, a2, . . . , a(n − 1)) and
(a2, · · · , a(n− 1), a(n)).
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
A. LogMaster architecture
LogMaster includes three major components: Log agent,
Log server, and Log database. On each node, Log agent
collects, preprocesses logs, and filters repeated events and
periodic events. And then Log agent sends events to Log server
for mining event rules, which are stored in Log database.
In Section III-C, we will propose two event correlation
mining approaches. At the same time, Log server constructs
3a set of graphs - event correlation graphs (ECG) to represent
event correlations. Section III-D will introduce the details of
ECG. LogMaster will mine event rules and their presentations
- ECG for other systems, for example a failure prediction or
fault diagnose system. Fig. 1 summarizes our event correlation
mining approaches.
Logs Event
preprocessing
Event rules
Other system like
failure prediction
systems
ECG
construction
Event mining
(Event
Correlation
Graph) ECG
Fig. 1: The summary of event correlation mining approaches.
B. An metrics for measuring event correlations
In this subsection, we define a simple metrics to measure
event correlations.
We assume that time synchronization services are deployed
on large-scale systems. The largest clock skew is easy to be
estimated using a simple clock synchronization algorithm [33]
[34] or the ntptrace [35] tool. With a time synchronization
service, like NTP, we can ignore the effect of clock skew
in our algorithm, since a NTP service can guarantee time
synchronization to a large extent. For example, NTPv4 can
achieve an accuracy of 200 microseconds or better in local
area networks under ideal conditions.
As shown in Fig. 2, we analyze the whole log history to
generate event rules. In our approach, we use a sliding time
window to analyze logs. For each current event, we save events
within a sliding time window (according to timestamps) to the
log buffer, and analyze events in the log buffer to mine event
rules. After an event log has been analyzed, we will advance
the sliding time window according to the timestamp of the
current event.
Prediction
valid
durationprediction
time
The whole log history
Offline Analysis time for
generating event rules
Time
Predicting
point
Predicted
point
Expiration
pointSliding time windows
of Log buffer
Fig. 2: The time relations in our event correlation mining and
event prediction systems.
Considering the events may happen interleavedly, we pro-
pose a confidence metrics to measure the correlation of an
LES as follows:
we count on two important attributes : the support count,
and the posterior count. The support count is the recurring
times of the preceding events which are followed by the
posterior event, while the posterior count is the recurring times
of the posterior event which follows the preceding events.
For example, if an event sequence BACBBA occur in a
time window, for a 2 − ary LES (A,B), the support count
is one, and the posterior count is two; for a 3 − ary LES
(A,C,B), the support count is one and the posterior count is
two. The confidence metrics is calculated to measure the event
correlation according to Equation 1.
Confidence =
support count(LES)
posterior count(LES)
(1)
According to Equation 1, in BACBBA, the confidence of
an 2 − ary LES (A,B) is 1/2. In other words, if an event A
occurs, an event B will occur with the probability of 50%.
Based on the above definitions, we formally define frequent
LES and event rule as follows: for an LES, if its adjacent
subsets are frequent and its support count exceeds a predefined
threshold, we call it a frequent LES. For a frequent LES, if its
confidence exceeds a predefined threshold, we call it an event
rule.
C. Event correlation mining algorithms
In this section, we propose two event correlation min-
ing algorithms: an Apriori-LES algorithm and its improved
version—Apriori-simiLES.
The notations of the Apriori-LES and Apriori-simiLES
algorithm are listed in TABLE. III.
Notation Description
Tw the size of sliding time window
Sth the threshold of the support counts of LES
Cth the threshold of confidence of event rules
C(k) a set of frequent k-ary LES candidates
F(k) a set of frequent k-ary LES
R(k) a set of k-ary event rules
TABLE III: Notations of the Apriori-LES and Apriori-
simiLES
1) Apriori-LES algorithm: In data mining approaches,
Apriori is a classic algorithm for learning association rules in
transactional data [52] [53]. Apriori uses a breadth-first search
and a tree structure to count item set candidates. According
to the downward closure lemma [52] [53], a k− length item
set candidate contains all frequent (k− 1)− length item sets.
The Apriori algorithm generates frequent k− length item set
candidates from frequent (k − 1) − length item sets. After
that, it scans transaction data to determine frequent item sets
among the candidates.
As mentioned in Section I, logs are significantly different
from transaction data. We propose an algorithm to mine event
rules, which we call the Apriori-LES algorithm. The Apriori-
LES algorithm is as follows:
4Step 1: Predefine two threshold values Sth and Cth for the
support count and the confidence, respectively.
Step 2: Add all events that have different log IDs with the
support count above the threshold value Sth to F (k = 1);
Step 3: K = k + 1; C(k) = {}; F (k) = {}; R(k) = {};
Step 4: Get all frequent k−ary LES candidates. We generate
the frequent k−ary LES candidate by the LINK operation of
two frequent (k − 1) − ary adjacent subsets, and add it into
C(k).
The LINK operation is defined as below: for two frequent
(k-1)-ary LES, if the last (k-2) log IDs of the one (k-
1)-ary LES are same like the first (k-2) log IDs of the
other (k-1)-ary LES, the result of the LINK operation is:
LINK((a1, a2, · · · , a(k − 1)), (a2, · · · , a(k − 1), a(k)) =
(a1, a2, · · · , a(k − 1), a(k))
For example, if (A,B,C) and (B,C,D) are frequent
3− ary LES in F (3), then a 4− ary LES (A,B,C,D) is a
frequent 4−ary LES candidate, which we will add into C(4).
Step 5: Scan the logs to validate each frequent k−ary LES
candidates in C(k). The support count and posterior count of
each k−ary LES candidate in C(k) is counted. For a frequent
k − ary LES candidate (a1, a2, · · · , a(k − 1), a(k)), if event
a(k− 1) occurs after any event in (a1, a2, · · · , a(k− 2)) and
before the posterior event m times, and the posterior event
occurs after any event in (a1, a2, · · · , a(k − 2), a(k − 1)) n
times, we increment the support count and the posterior count
of the k − ary LES candidate by m and n, respectively.
Step 6: Generate frequent k − ary LES and k − ary event
rules. For a k−ary frequent LES candidate, if its support count
is above the threshold Sth, add it into F (k). For a k − ary
LES candidate, if its support count and confidence are above
the threshold values: Sth and Cth, respectively, add it into
R(k).
Step 7: Loop until all frequent LES and event rules are
found, and save them in Log database. If R(k) is not null,
save k − ary event rules in R(k). If F (k) is not null, go to
step 3; else end the algorithm.
2) Apriori-simiLES algorithm: As shown in Section V, the
Apriori-LES algorithm still suffers from inefficiency, and gen-
erates a large amount of frequent LES candidate, which may
lead to a long analysis time. In order to improve performance
and save costs while ensuring the algorithm’s efficiency, we
observe the breakdown of event rules through mining about
ten days’s logs of the Hadoop system (in Nov 2008) and the
HPC cluster system (in Jan 2004 ), respectively.
We set the following configuration in the Apriori-LES
algorithm: the sliding time window (Tw), the support count
threshold (Sth), and the confidence threshold (Cth) are 60
minutes, 5, and 0.25, respectively. We only mine 2−ary event
rules so as to simplify the experiments.
In all, we get 517 2 − ary event rules in the Hadoop logs
and 156 2−ary event rules in the HPC logs. When we analyze
the breakdown of 2-ary event rules generated by the Apriori-
LES algorithm, we find that most of 2 − ary event rules are
composed of events that occur on the same nodes or the same
applications, or have the same event types. This phenomenon
is probably due to: (a) error may spread in a single node.
For example: one application or process error can lead to
another application or process error. (b) replicated applications
in multiple nodes may have same errors or software bugs, and
same failure events may appear in multiple nodes. (c) nodes in
an large-scale system need to transfer data and communicate
with each other, so a failure on one node may cause failures
of same event types on other nodes. (d) a failure on one node
may change the cluster system environment, which may cause
failures of same event types on other nodes. The analysis
results are shown in TABLE. IV and TABLE. V.
Description All Same
nodes
Same event
types
Same applica-
tions
count 517 168 172 159
Percent(%) 100% 32.5% 33.3% 30.8%
TABLE IV: The breakdown of 2 − ary event rules in the
Hadoop logs.
Description All Same
nodes
Same event
types
Same applica-
tions
count 156 10 48 52
Percent(%) 100% 6.4% 30.8% 33.3%
TABLE V: The breakdown of 2− ary event rules in the HPC
logs.
On the basis of these observations, we propose an improved
version of the Apriori-LES algorithm: Apriori-simiLES. The
distinguished difference of Apriori-simiLES from Apriori-LES
is that the former uses an event filtering policy before the event
correlation mining. The event filtering policy is described
as below: to reduce the number of the analyzed events and
decrease the analysis time, we only analyze correlations of
events that occur in (a) the same nodes or (b) the same
applications, or have (c) the same event types.
The Apriori-simiLES algorithm includes two rounds of
analysis: a single-node analysis and a multiple-node analysis.
In the single-node analysis, we use the Apriori-LES algorithm
to mine event rules that have same node IDs. And in the
multiple-node analysis, we use the Apriori-LES algorithm to
mine event rules that are of the same application names or the
same event types but with different node IDs.
D. ECGs construction
After two rounds of analysis, we get a series of event rules.
Based on the event rules, we propose a new abstraction—event
correlation graphs (ECGs) to represent event rules.
A ECG is a directed acyclic graph (DAG). A vertex in a
ECG represents a event. For a vertex, its children vertexes
are its posterior events in event rules. There are two types of
vertexes: dominant and recessive. For a 2−ary event rule, such
as (A,B), the vertexes representing events A, B are dominant
vertexes. An additional vertex A ∧B represents the case that
A and B occurred and B occurred after A. The vertex A∧B
is a recessive vertex.
5Vertexes are linked by edges. An edge represents the corre-
lation of two events linked by the edge. Each edge in ECG has
five attributes: head vertex, tail vertex, support count, posterior
count and edge type. Similar to vertexes, edges have two types:
dominant and recessive. If two vertexes linked by an edge are
dominant, the edge type is dominant; otherwise, the edge type
is recessive. For a 2− ary event rule (A,B), the head vertex
is B, and the tail vertex is A; the support count and posterior
count of the edge is the support count and posterior count
of the rule event (A,B), respectively. For a 3 − ary event
rule (A,B,C), the head vertex is C, and the tail vertex is the
recessive vertex A ∧ B; the support count and the posterior
count of the edge is the support count and the posterior count
of the event rule (A,B,C), respectively.
An example is shown in Fig. 3. There are three 2−ary event
rules: (A,B), (B,C) and (C,D), and two 3− ary (A,B,C)
and (A,B,D). We generate four dominant vertexes, which
represent events A, B, C, and D. We also generate three
dominant edges which represent the event rules (A,B) and
(B,C) and (C,D). In additional, we also generate a recessive
vertex (A∧B). A recessive edge (A∧B → C) represents the
event rule (A,B,C), and a recessive edge (A ∧ B → D)
represents the event rule (A,B,D). The additional vertex
A ∧B is the child of both A and B.
A^B
A B C
Dominant 
vertex
Dominan
t edge
Recessive 
vertex
Recessive 
edge
D
Fig. 3: An example of ECG.
Choosing the ECG abstraction has three reasons: first, the
visualized graphs are easy to understand by system managers
and operators; second, the abstraction facilitates modeling
sophisticated correlations of events, such as k − ary (k > 2)
event rules; third, ECGs can be easily updated in time since
the attributes of edges and vertexes are easily updated when a
new event comes.
The construction of ECGs includes three main steps:
Step 1: Construct a group of ECGs based on event rules
found in the single-node analysis. Each ECG represent corre-
lations of events in one node.
Based on event rules generated in the analysis, the vertexes
and edges of ECGs are created. For each event rule, dominant
vertexes and recessive vertexes are generated, and edges
between vertexes are created too.
Step 2: ECGs that represent correlations of events on
multiple nodes are constructed based on event rules found in
multiple-nodes analysis.
Step 3: The index of ECGs is created, and the positions of
events in ECGs are also saved. We can locate events by using
these indexes.
The ECG ID and the ECG entrance vertex are the index of
the ECGs. The ECG position is the index of each event in an
ECG. So it is convenient to locate events in the ECGs.
After these three steps, a series of ECGs that describe the
correlation of events are constructed.
E. Event Prediction
For each prediction, there are three important timing points:
predicting point, predicted point, and expiration point. The
relations of those timing points are shown in Fig. 2.
The prediction system begins predicting events at the timing
of the predicting point. The predicted point is the occurrence
timing of the predicted event. The expiration point refers to the
expiration time of a prediction, which means this prediction is
not valid if the actual occurrence timing of the event passed
the expiration point.
In addition, there are two important derived properties for
each prediction: prediction time, and prediction valid duration.
The prediction time is the time difference between the pre-
dicting point and the predicted point, which is the time span
left for system administrators to respond with the possible
upcoming failures. The prediction valid duration is the time
difference between the predicting point and the expiration
point.
The event prediction algorithm based on ECGs is as follows:
Step 1: Define the prediction probability threshold Pth, and
the prediction valid duration Tp.
Step 2: When an event comes, the indexes of events
are searched to find matching ECGs and the corresponding
vertexes in ECGs. The searched vertexes are marked. For a
recessive edge, if its tail vertex is marked, the recessive edge
is marked, too. For a recessive head vertex, if all recessive
edges are marked, the recessive vertex is also marked. We
mark vertexes so as to predict events; and the head vertexes
that are dominant vertexes are searched according to the edges
(both dominant and recessive edge types) linked with marked
vertexes.
Step 3: The probabilities of the head vertexes are calculated
according to the attributions of vertexes that are marked and
their adjacent edges in the ECGs. For a head vertex, we
calculate its probability as the probability of tail vertex times
the confidence of the edge. If a head vertex is linked with two
marked vertexes with different edges, we will calculate two
probabilities, and we choose the largest one as the probability
of the head vertex.
An example is shown in Fig. 4. When an event A occurs,
the vertex A and the edge A → A ∧ B are marked. We can
calculate the probability of B according to the confidence of
the edge A → B. The probability of event C also can be
calculated by the dominant edges A → B and B → C. If
the probability of event B or event C is above the prediction
probability threshold Pth, it is predicted. So does the event
D.
Probability(B) = confidence(A→ B) (2)
6Probability(C) = probability(B) ∗ confidence(B → C)
= confidence(A→ B) ∗ confidence(B → C) (3)
When an event B occurs later, the vertex B and the edge
B → A ∧ B are marked. Because the edge A → A ∧ B and
B → A∧B are both marked, so the vertex A∧B are marked
too. The probability of events C and D are also calculated
according to the new edges.
A^B
A B C
Dominant 
vertex
Dominant
edge
Recessive 
vertex
Recessive
edge
D
Marked
vertex
A^B
A B C D
A^B
A B C D
ECG after 
event A occurs
ECG after 
event B occurs
ECG after 
event C occurs
Marked
edge
Fig. 4: An example of event prediction.
Step 4: If the probability of a head vertex is above the
prediction probability threshold Pth, then the head vertex is
the predicted event.
Step 5: Loop Step 2.
IV. LOGMASTER IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented an event correlation mining system
and an event prediction system. The main modules of Log-
Master are as follows:
(1) The configuration file and Log database. A XML-format
configuration file named config.xml includes the regular ex-
pressions of important definitions, formats, and keywords that
are used to parse logs and the configuration of Log database.
Log database is a MySQL database, including the tables
of the formatted logs, the filtered logs, and the event rules.
We define event attributions in the section ”definitions”, and
the definitions include timestamp, node name, application,
process, process id, user, description, and so on. The
formats of event logs are defined in the section ”format”. All
keywords that are used to decide the severity degree and event
type of logs are defined in the section ”keywords”.
(2) The Python scripts are used to parse system log files ac-
cording to the regular expressions defined in the configuration
file. The parsed logs are saved to the table of the formatted
logs in Log database.
An example of the original event logs and the corresponding
formatted event logs is shown as bellows:
[Original event log] Oct 26 04:04:20 compute-3-9.local
smartd [3019]: Device: /dev/sdd, FAILED SMART self-check.
BACK UP DATA NOW!
[Formatted event log] timestamp =”20081024040420”,
node name =”compute-3-9.local”, format =”format1”, key-
word = ”FAILED SMART”, application=”smartd”, pro-
cess=”NULL”, process id=”3019”, user=”NULL”, descrip-
tion=”Device: /dev/sdd, FAILED SMART self-check. BACK
UP DATA NOW!”.
(3) Log server is written in Java. The simple filtering oper-
ations are performed to remove repeated events and periodic
events. The filtered logs are saved in the table of filtered
logs in Log database. We implemented both Apriori-LES and
Apriori-semiLES algorithms. The attributions of each event
rules, including event attributions, support count, posterior
count, and confidence are saved to the table of event rules
in Log database.
(4) We implement the event rules based prediction system
in C++.
V. EVALUATIONS
In this section, we use LogMaster to analyze logs of a
production Hadoop cluster system and a HPC cluster system
logs, the detail of two logs are described in Section II-A. The
server we used has two Intel Xeon Quad-Core E5405 2.0GHZ
processors, 137GB disk, and 8G memory.
A. Filtering Events
In this step, we remove repeated events and periodic events.
After collecting logs, Log sever will perform a simple fil-
tering according to two observations: first, there are two types
of repeated events: one kind of repeated events are recorded
by different subsystems, and the other kind of repeated events
repeatedly occur in a short time windows. Second, periodic
events. Some events periodically occur with a fixed interval
because of hardware or software bugs. Each type of periodic
events may have two or more fixed cycles. For example,
if a daemon in a node monitors CPU or memory systems
periodically, it may produce large amount of periodic events.
We use a simple statistical algorithm and a simple clustering
algorithm to remove repeated events and periodic events,
respectively. The solution to removing repeated events is as
follows: for the first step, we treat events with the same logID
and the same timestamp as repeated events. For the second
step, we treat events with the same logID occurring in a small
time windows as repeated events. In this experiment, we set
this interval threshold as 10 seconds, and the reason is that
we consider the repeated events should occur in a short time
windows.
The solution to removing periodic events is as follows:
for each log ID, update the counts of events for different
intervals. For periodic events with the same log ID, if the
count and the event percent of the same interval, which is
obtained against all periodic events with the same log ID, is
higher than the predefined threshold values, respectively, we
consider the interval as a fixed cycle. In our experiment, we
7set two predefined threshold values of the Hadoop logs and the
HPC logs as (20, 0.2) and (20, 0.1), respectively. The effects
of different threshold values on the number of filtered events
can be found at Appendix A. Lastly, we only keep one event
for periodic events with the same fixed cycle. For periodic
events, only events deviated from the fixed cycle are reserved.
TABLE VI shows the experiments results. In preprocessing,
our python scripts parse about 977,858 original Hadoop event
entries in 4 minutes 24 seconds, and interpret those events into
nine-tuples, which are stored into the MySQL database. We
parse 176,043 original HPC cluster event entries in 2 minutes
28 seconds. Please note that we only select the node logs
from the HPC logs without including other events, e.g., that
of ”switch module” , since the Hadoop logs only include node
logs.
logs raw
logs
Pre pro-
cessing
Removing
repeated
events
Removing
periodic
events
Compression
rate
Hadoop 977,858 977,858 375,369 26,538 97.29%
HPC cluster 433,490 176,043 152,112 132,650 69.4%
TABLE VI: The results of preprocessing and filtering logs.
In this experiment, the compression rate of the Hadoop logs
can achieves 97.29%, but the compression rate of the HPC logs
only achieves 69.4%. The reason is probably that the Hadoop
logs have a large amount of repeated events, while the HPC
logs have relatively small number of events for a long period,
and hence have less repeated events. The periodic events of
HPC logs are small, and the reason is that the HPC logs have
a long time span.
B. Comparison of two event correlation mining algorithms
In this step, we compare two proposed algorithms: Apriori-
LES and Apriori-simiES. We use (a) the average analysis time
per events and (b) the number of event rules to evaluate the
computational complexity and the efficiency of Apriori-LES
and Apriori-simiES algorithms, respectively.
For the Hadoop logs, we analyze 43 days’ logs from 2008-
10-26 04:04:20.0 to 2008-12-09 23:21:28.0. For the HPC logs,
we analyze 48 days’ logs from 2003-12-26 22:12:30.0 to 2004-
02-13 03:02:39.0.
Before reporting experiment results of two algorithms, we
pick the following parameters as the baseline configuration
of LogMaster for comparisons. Through comparisons with an
large amount of experiments, we set the baseline parameters
in LogMaster: Hadoop logs—[Tw60/Sth5/Cth0.25] and HPC
logs—[Tw60/Sth5/Cth0.25]. [Twx/Sthy/Cthz] indicates that the
sliding time window Tw is x minutes, the threshold of support
count Sth is y, and the threshold of confidence Cth is z.
The effect of varying parameters (Tw, Sth and Cth) on the
average analysis time per event and the number of event rules
can be found in Appendix B.
The comparison experiments show that: for the Hadoop
logs, the average analysis time of Apriori-simiLES is about
10%-20% of that of Apriori-LES, while Apriori-simiLES
obtains about 60%-70% event rules of that of Apriori-LES; For
the HPC logs, the average analysis time of Apriori-simiLES
is about 10%-20% of that of Apriori-LES algorithm, while
Apriori-simiLES obtains about 80%-90% event rules of that
of Apriori-LES.
C. The summaries of events and event rules in two typical
cluster systems
In two typical cluster systems for Cloud and HPC, respec-
tively, we give the summaries of the events and events rules,
which are generated by the Apriori-LES algorithm with the
baseline parameters mentioned above.
(a) In the Hadoop logs, the number of events of different
types ranks according to the order: FILESYSTEM, HARD-
WARE, SOFTWARE, SYSTEM, MEMORY, NETWORK and
OTHER. In the HPC logs, the number of events of different
types ranks according to the order: HARDWARE, SYSTEM,
NETWORK, FILESYSTEM, CLUSTERSYSTEM, and KER-
NEL. Please note that the event types of two logs are slightly
different. For the HPC logs, the event types are recorded in the
original logs, while for the Hadoop logs the event types are
parsed by ourself. The breakdown of logs is shown in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5: The breakdown of event types of two system logs.
(b) Most of event rules are composed of events with the
FILESYSTEM type in the Hadoop logs, and the reason may
be that applications running on the Hadoop cluster system are
data-intensive, and need to access the file system frequently;
However, most of event rules in the HPC logs are composed of
events of HARDWARE and SYSTEM types, and it is probable
that hardware and system level errors more easily lead to
failures in HPC cluster systems.
With the same baseline configuration like that in V-B, we
obtain 2 or 3-ary event rules with Apriori-LES and Apriori-
simiLES as shown in TABLE VII.
Event Rules Hadoop logs HPC cluster logsApriori-
LES
Apriori-
simiLES
Apriori-
LES
Apriori-
simiLES
2− ary 2413 1520 4726 3990
3− ary 1603 1603 1695 1695
TABLE VII: The event rules obtained from two algorithms.
We also analyze the breakdown of event rules that lead to
failure events. As shown in TABLE VIII, with the exception
of the event rules in the HPC logs obtained with the Apriori-
simiLES algorithm, event rules that identify correlations be-
tween non-failure events (including ”INFO”, ”WARNING”,
8”ERROR”) and failure events (”FATAL” and ”FAILURE”))
dominate over the event rules that identify the correlations
between different failure events.
Failure Rules(No.) Hadoop logs HPC cluster logsApriori-
LES
Apriori-
simiLES
Apriori-
LES
Apriori-
simiLES
Configuration [Tw60/Sth5/Cth0.25] [Tw60/Sth5/Cth0.25]
Non-failures→Failures 377 180 97 5
Failures→Failures 86 78 26 26
TABLE VIII: The event rules obtained from two algorithms
logid1 logid2 nodeid1 type1 nodeid2 type2 confidence
3314 3311 249 memory 249 system 0.997487
370 359 42 hardware 42 filesystem 0.993789
91 89 4 software 4 system 0.961538
2034 2035 164 filesystem 164 filesystem 0.952381
1412 1413 120 software 120 software 0.947368
66 64 2 system 2 software 0.947368
147 148 12 filesystem 12 hardware 0.9375
3632 3628 260 system 260 software 0.933333
3627 3628 270 filesystem 270 software 0.933333
172 169 22 hardware 22 filesystem 0.928571
TABLE IX: Top 10 2 − ary event rules in the order of the
descending confidence in the Hadoop logs
logid1 logid2 nodeid1 type1 nodeid2 type2 confidence
4671 4682 260 hardware 260 hardware 0.975
2598 2580 153 hardware 153 hardware 0.975
2601 2619 154 hardware 154 hardware 0.928571
2193 2180 131 hardware 131 hardware 0.923077
2774 2883 162 hardware 167 hardware 0.923077
2796 2883 163 hardware 167 hardware 0.923077
2819 2985 164 hardware 172 hardware 0.923077
2556 2539 151 hardware 151 hardware 0.916667
3195 3212 182 hardware 182 hardware 0.916667
2661 2643 156 hardware 156 hardware 0.909091
TABLE X: Top 10 2− ary event rules in order of confidence
in the HPC logs.
The top 10 2−ary event rules in the order of the descending
confidence in the Hadoop logs and the HPC logs are shown in
TABLE IX and TABLE X, respectively. For the top one 2−
ary event rule in the Hadoop logs—(3314, 3311), the original
logs are shown in TABLE XI.
[Log id=3314] 2008-12-06 05:04:27 compute-12-9.local looks like a
64bit wrap, but prev!=new
[Log id=3311] 2008-12-06 05:04:57 compute-12-9.local c64 32 bit
check failed
TABLE XI: The original logs of (3314, 3311).
D. Evaluation of predication
After mining the event rules, we need to consider whether
these event rules are suitable for predicting events. We evaluate
our algorithms in three scenarios: (a) predicting all events on
the basis of both failure and non-failure events; (b) predicting
only failure events on the basis of both failure and non-failure
events; (c) predicting failure events after removing non-failure
events.
On the basis of event rules obtained in Section V-C, we
predict 21 days’ logs from 2008-12-10 00:00:38.0 to 2008-
12-31 15:32:03.0 in the Hadoop logs, and 14 days’ logs from
2004-02-13 03:02:41.0 to 2004-02-27 19:02:00.0, respectively.
We use the precision rate, the recall rate, and the average
prediction time of event prediction to evaluate the prediction.
The true positive (TP) is the count of events which are
correctly predicted. The false positive (FP) is the count of
events which are predicted but not appeared in the prediction
valid duration. The precision rate is the ratio of the correctly
predicted events (TP) to all predicted events, including TP and
FP. The recall rate is the ratio of correctly predicted events
(TP) to all filtered events. We calculate the average prediction
time according to Equation 4.
The average prediction time =
∑
(the predicted point− the predicting point)
count of all predicted events (4)
There are two parameters that affect the prediction
accuracy, including the prediction probability threshold
(Pth) and the prediction valid duration (Tp). Before re-
porting experiment results, we pick the following pa-
rameters as the baseline configuration for comparisons.
Through comparisons with large amount of experiments,
we set the baseline parameters of the Hadoop logs-
[Tw60/Sth5/Cth0.25/Pth0.5/Tp60] and the baseline parame-
ters of the HPC logs-[Tw60/Sth5/Cth0.25/Pth0.5/Tp60]. Please
note that Tw, Sth, Cth just keep the same baseline parameters
in Section V-B.
[Pthu/Tpv] indicates that the prediction probability threshold
Pth is u, and the prediction valid duration Tp is v minutes.
The effects of varying Pth and Tp on failure predictions can
be found at Appendix C.
First, on the basis of events of both failure and non-failure
events, we predict all events, including ”INFO”, ”WARNING”,
”ERROR”, ”FAILURE”, and ”FATAL” events. The precision
rates and recall rates of predicting events in the Hadoop logs
and the HPC logs are shown in Fig. 6. From Fig. 6, we
can observe that with Apriori-LES, the precision rates of the
Hadoop logs and the HPC logs are high as 78.20%, 81.19%,
respectively, while the recall rates of the Hadoop logs and the
HPC logs are 33.63% and 20.73%, respectively. The reason
for the low recall rates is that we still keep rich log information
after filtering events, including 26,538 entries (2.71% of the
original Hadoop logs) and 132,650 entries (30.6% of the
original HPC logs), respectively. We also notice that adopting
a more efficient algorithm—Apriori-semiLES, which mines
fewer event rules, results in higher precision rates. This is
because with Apriori-LES we can obtain more event rules,
which predicts more events which not happen.
Second, on the basis of events of all types, we only
predict failure events (Failure and FATAL types), of which
9the precision rates and the recall rates of two logs are shown
in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 6: The precision rate and recall rate of predicting events
(including failure and non-failure events) on the basis of failure
and non-failure events.
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Fig. 7: The precision rate and recall rate of predicting failure
events on the basis of both failure and non-failure events.
For predicting failure events, Liang et al. [6] suggest
removing events with the types of INFO, WARNING, and
ERROR in preprocessing events. Lastly, following their idea,
we remove non-failure events, and then predict failure events
in the subsequent experiments.
TABLE XII reports the filtered events at different stages.
With respect to TABLE VI, TABLE XII show after removing
non-failure events, only a small fraction of events are reserved:
1,993 v.s. 132,650 entries (not removing non-failure events)
for the HPC logs; 3,112 v.s. 26,538 entries (not removing non-
failure events) for the Hadoop logs. Then we predict failure
events after removing non-failure events, and the precision
rates and recall rates of predicting failure events are shown
in Fig. 8.
From Figs.7 and 8, we can observe two points. First, after
removing non-failure events, the precision rates in predicting
failures are lower than that without removing non-failure
events. The reason is that in both logs the numbers of the event
rules that identify correlations between non-failure events and
failure events are higher than that of the event rules that
identify the correlations between different failure events as
shown in TABLE VIII in Section V-C. Second, in predicting
failures ( FAILURE and FATAL), the recall rates are low
(especially for the Hadoop logs). This observation has two
reasons. (a) Some events are independent, and they have not
correlated events. (b) Because of the setting of the sliding time
window, the support count and the posterior count threshold
values, some weak-correlated or long time-correlated event
rules may be discarded.
logs raw
logs
Removing
repeated
events
Removing
non-
failure
events
Removing
periodic
events
Compression
rate
Hadoop 977,858 375,369 53,259 3,112 99.68%
HPC 433,490 152,112 5,427 1,993 99.54%
TABLE XII: The results of filtered events after removing non-
failure events.
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Fig. 8: The precision rate and recall rate of predicting failure
events after removing non-failure events.
With the same baseline configurations, the average predic-
tion time of two logs is shown in TABLE XIII, which indicates
that system administrators or autonomic systems should have
enough time to monitor and handle predicted events.
Average prediction time(minutes) Hadoop
logs
HPC clus-
ter logs
event prediction 42.78 4.01
failure prediction 52.01 25.57
failure prediction after removing non-failure 52.01 25.57
TABLE XIII: The average prediction time.
VI. RELATED WORK
We summarize the related work from five perspectives:
characterizing failure characteristics, log preprocessing, event
correlation mining, anomaly (failure or performance bottle-
neck) prediction, and failure diagnosis.
A. characterizing failure characteristics
It has been long recognized that failure events are correlated,
not independent. For example, in the year of 1992, Tang et
al. [30] concluded that the impact of correlated failures on
dependability is significant. The work in [1] has observed that
there are strong spatial correlations between failure events and
most of the failure events occur on a small fraction of the
nodes. The work in [6] presents that some failure events such
as network failure events and application I/O failure events
show more pronounced skewness in the spatial distribution.
The work of [3] and [6] has found that failure events can
propagate in the systems.
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Some work uses statistical analysis approach to find simple
temporal and spatial laws or models of system events [13] [3]
[28] in large-scale cluster systems like Bluegene/L. When the
obtained knowledge is used in failure prediction, it may bring
good precision rate and recall rate, but the prediction results
are coarse and high level without the detail.
Daniel et al. [64] characterize the availability properties
of cloud storage systems based on an extensive one year
study of Googles main storage infrastructure and present
statistical models that enable further insight into the impact of
multiple design choices, such as data placement and replication
strategies.
Edmund et al. [66] present the first large-scale analysis
of hardware failure rates on a million consumer PCs. They
found that many failures are neither transient nor independent.
Instead, a large portion of hardware induced failures are
recurrent: a machine that crashes from a fault in hardware is
up to two orders of magnitude more likely to crash a second
time.
B. Log Pre-processing
Zheng et al. [25] proposes a log pre-processing method,
and adopt a causality-related filtering approach to combining
correlated events for filtering through apriori association rule
mining.
In these research efforts, the concept of event cluster [6]
is proposed to deal with multiple redundant records of fatal
events at one location for event filtering; an apriori association
rule mining [10] is presented to identify the sets of fatal events
co-occurring frequently and filter them together; an automated
soft competitive learning neural-gas method [28] is used for
cluster analysis to reduce dependent events.
C. Event Correlation Mining
In the data mining field, [59] [58] concern about mining
closed sequential patterns, [55] [57] discusses the frequent pat-
tern mining, [54] [53] [52] focus on generalizing association
rules to correlations.
Hellerstein et al. [10] present efficient algorithms to mine
three types of important patterns from historical event data:
event bursts, periodic patterns, and mutually dependent pat-
terns, discuss a framework for efficiently mining events that
have multiple attributes, and finally build a tool—Event Cor-
relation Constructor that validates and extends correlation
knowledge.
Lou [31] propose an approach to mine inter-component
dependencies from unstructured logs: parse each log message
into keys and parameters; find dependent log key pairs belong
to different components by leveraging co-occurrence analysis
and parameter correspondence; use Bayesian decision theory
to estimate the dependency direction of each dependent log
key pair.
Mannila et al. [57] give efficient algorithms for the discov-
ery of all frequent episodes from a given class of episodes,
and present detailed experimental results.
Though lots of previous efforts have proposed failures
mining approaches for different purposes, for example event
filtering [6][25], event coalescing [28], or failure prediction
[2], little work proposes the event correlation mining system
for large-scale cluster systems.
D. Anomaly (Failure or Performance Bottleneck) Prediction
1) Performance bottleneck prediction: Zhang et al. [15]
proposes a precise request tracing algorithm for multi-tier ser-
vices of black boxes, which only uses application-independent
knowledge and constructs a component activity graph abstrac-
tion to represent causal paths of requests and facilitate end-to-
end performance debugging.
Gu et al. [37] focus on predicting the bottleneck anomaly,
the most common anomaly in data stream processing clus-
ters. Their approach integrates naive Bayesian classification
method, which captures the distinct symptoms of different
bottlenecks caused by various reasons, and Markov models,
which capture the changing patterns of different measurement
metrics that are used as features by the Bayesian classifiers,
to achieve the anomaly prediction goal.
Tan et al. [38] presents the context-aware anomaly pre-
diction model training algorithm to predict various system
anomalies such as performance bottlenecks, resource hotspots,
and service level objective (SLO) violations. They first employ
a clustering algorithm to discover different execution contexts
in dynamic systems, and then train a set of prediction models,
each of which is responsible for predicting anomalies under a
specific context.
Shen et al. [47] propose a model-driven anomaly charac-
terization approach and use it to discover operating system
performance bugs when supporting disk I/O-intensive online
servers.
2) Failure prediction: Gujrati et al. [5] presents a meta-
learning method based on statistical analysis and standard
association rule algorithm. They not only obtain the statistical
characteristics of failures, but also generate association rules
between nonfatal and fatal events for failure predictions.
Fu et al. [3][4] develops a spherical covariance model with
an adjustable timescale parameter to quantify the temporal
correlation and a stochastic model to describe spatial corre-
lation. They cluster failure events based on their correlations
and predict their future occurrences.
Fulp et al. [19] describes a spectrum-kernel Support Vector
Machine (SVM) approach to predict failure events based on
system log files. The approach described use a sliding window
(sub-sequence) of messages to predict the likelihood of failure.
E. Failure Diagnosis
Chen et al. [40] presents an instance based approach to
diagnosing failures in computing systems. Their method takes
advantage of past experiences by storing historical failures
in a database and developing a novel algorithm to efficiently
retrieve failure signatures from the database.
Oliner et al. [42] propose a method for identifying the
sources of problems in complex production systems where,
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due to the prohibitive costs of instrumentation, the data avail-
able for analysis may be noisy or incomplete.
John et al. [41] present a fault localization system called
Spotlight that essentially uses two basic ideas. First, it com-
presses a multi-tier dependency graph into a bipartite graph
with direct probabilistic edges between root causes and symp-
toms. Second, it runs a novel weighted greedy minimum set
cover algorithm to provide fast inference.
Console logs rarely help operators detect problems in large-
scale datacenter services, for they often consist of the volumi-
nous intermixing of messages from many software components
written by independent developers. Xu et al. [49] [36] propose
a general methodology to mine this rich source of information
to automatically detect system runtime problems.
Tucek et al. [48] propose a system Triage, that automatically
performs onsite software failure diagnosis at the very moment
of failure. It provides a detailed diagnosis report, including
the failure nature, triggering conditions, related code and
variables, the fault propagation chain, and potential fixes.
Tan et al. [60] propose SALSA—their approach to auto-
mated system-log analysis, which involves examining the logs
to trace control-flow and data-flow execution in a distributed
system, and derive state-machine-like views of the systems
execution on each node. Based on the derived state machine
views and statistics, they illustrate SALSA’s value by devel-
oping visualization and failure-diagnosis techniques for three
Hadoop workloads.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we designed and implemented an event
correlation mining system and an event prediction system.
We presented a simple metrics to measure correlations of
events that may happen interleavedly. On the basis of the
measurement of correlations, we proposed two approaches
to mining event correlations; meanwhile, we proposed an
innovative abstraction—event correlation graphs (ECGs) to
represent event correlations, and presented an ECGs-based
algorithm for event prediction. As two typical case studies, we
used LogMaster to analyze and predict logs of a production
Hadoop-based cloud computing system at Research Institution
of China Mobile, and a production HPC cluster system at Los
Alamos National Lab (LANL), respectively. For the first time,
we compared the breakdown of events of different types and
events rules in two typical cluster systems for Cloud and HPC,
respectively.
In the new future, we will investigate two issues. a) How to
use ECGs for fault diagnose in large-scale production cluster
systems? b) How to combine causal path-based solutions [15]
with the log mining approach to diagnosis failure events and
performance problems?
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APPENDIX A
CHOOSING THE THRESHOLD VALUES OF THE PERIODIC
COUNT AND THE PERIODIC RATIO IN FILTERING PERIODIC
EVENTS
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Fig. 9: Relationships between remaining events and two
thresholdsłperiodic count and periodic ratio.
As shown in Fig. 9, when the threshold of the periodic count
is less than 20, the remaining numbers of Hadoop system logs
and HPC cluster system logs change little. When the threshold
of the periodic count is above 20, the remaining events change
significantly, so we set the threshold of the periodic count as
20.
When the threshold of the periodic ratio of Hadoop system
logs is less than 0.2 and the threshold of periodic ratio of
HPC cluster system logs is less than 0.1, the remaining events
change little. So we set the threshold of the periodic ratio of
Hadoop system logs to 0.2 and the threshold of periodic ratio
of HPC cluster system logs to 0.1, respectively.
logs the threshold of peri-
odic count
the threshold of peri-
odic ratio
Hadoop 20 0.2
HPC cluster 20 0.1
TABLE XIV: Threshold selection of two logs
APPENDIX B
PARAMETERS EFFECTS IN EVENT CORRELATION MINING
The effects of parameters(Tw, Sth and Cth) on the average
analysis time per event and the number of event rules are
shown in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, respectively.
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Fig. 10: The effect of parameters(Tw, Sth and Cth) on the average analysis time per event.
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Fig. 11: The effect of parameters(Tw, Sth and Cth) on the number of event rules.
APPENDIX C
PARAMETERS EFFECTS IN EVENT PREDICTIONS
The effects of parameters(Pth and Tp) on the precision
rates and recall rates are shown in Fig. 12, Fig. 13, respec-
tively.
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Fig. 12: The effects of the parameter Pth on the precision rate and the recall rate of the Hadoop system logs and the HPC
cluster system logs in predicting all events on the basis of both failure and non-failure events, predicting only failure events
on the basis of both failure and non-failure events, and predicting failure events after removing non-failure events (from left
to right).
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Fig. 13: The effects of the parameter Tp on the precision rate and recall rate of the Hadoop system logs and the HPC cluster
system logs in predicting all events on the basis of both failure and non-failure events, predicting only failure events on the
basis of both failure and non-failure events, and predicting failure events after removing non-failure events (from left to right).
